Detection: Windows Non-System Process Querying Definition Update

Description

Detects DNS queries to definitionupdates.microsoft.com or the go.microsoft.com fwlink redirect used for WD update downloads, when the querying process is not a Windows system component. BlueHammer utilizes these definition updates as part of its exploit chain.

 1`sysmon`
 2EventID="22"
 3QueryName="*definitionupdates.microsoft.com*"
 4NOT Image IN (
 5    "*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\*",
 6    "*:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender\\*",
 7    "*:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\*",
 8    "*:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
 9    "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*"
10)
11
12| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime BY answer answer_count dvc Computer process_exec process_guid process_name query query_count reply_code_id signature signature_id src user_id vendor_product QueryName QueryResults QueryStatus
13
14| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
15
16| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
17
18| rename Computer as dest
19
20| `windows_non_system_process_querying_definition_update_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Sysmon EventID 22 Windows icon Windows 'XmlWinEventLog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
windows_non_system_process_querying_definition_update_filter search *
windows_non_system_process_querying_definition_update_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

CVE

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Finding (Notable) No
Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) Yes
Anomaly detections generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events). They do not generate a Finding (Notable) directly.

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Legitimate third-party applications or security tools may query these update domains for Windows Defender updates. Filter alerts for trusted software and verified update mechanisms.

Associated Analytic Story

Intermediate Findings

Message Entity Field Entity Type Risk Score
Non-System process $Image$ queried Windows Defender Definition Updates domain $QueryName$ on $dest$. dest system 20

Threat Objects

Field Type
process_name process_name

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 1