Detection: Windows Suspicious Defender Engine or Signature Files Created
Description
Detects Windows Defender engine (mpengine.dll) or signature database files (*.vdm) being created by any process that is not a Windows Defender component.
BlueHammer extracts these files from the downloaded mpam-fe update package into a UUID-named subdirectory of %TEMP% as part of staging the TOCTOU privilege escalation.
Search
1`sysmon` EventID="11"
2TargetFilename IN (
3 "*\\mpasbase.vdm*",
4 "*\\mpasdlta.vdm*",
5 "*\\mpavbase.vdm*",
6 "*\\mpavdlta.vdm*",
7 "*\\mpengine.dll*"
8)
9NOT Image IN (
10 "*:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\*",
11 "*:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender\\*"
12)
13
14| fillnull
15
16| rename Computer as dest
17
18| stats count by dest TargetFilename Image EventID
19 action file_name file_path process_guid
20 process_id user vendor_product
21
22
23| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
24
25| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
26
27| `windows_suspicious_defender_engine_or_signature_files_created_filter`
Data Source
| Name |
Platform |
Sourcetype |
Source |
| Sysmon EventID 11 |
Windows |
'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
| Name |
Value |
| security_content_ctime |
convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
| windows_suspicious_defender_engine_or_signature_files_created_filter |
search * |
windows_suspicious_defender_engine_or_signature_files_created_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
| ID |
Technique |
Tactic |
| T1068 |
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
Privilege Escalation |
CVE
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting |
Value |
| Disabled |
true |
| Cron Schedule |
0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time |
-70m@m |
| Latest Time |
-10m@m |
| Schedule Window |
auto |
| Creates Finding (Notable) |
No |
| Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) |
Yes |
Anomaly detections generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events). They do not generate a Finding (Notable) directly.
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Some legitimate software updates or security tools may create Windows Defender engine or signature files in user temp folders during scanning or updating processes.
Filter detections for trusted update utilities and system maintenance tasks.
Associated Analytic Story
| Message |
Entity Field |
Entity Type |
Risk Score |
| Windows Defender Engine or Signature file $file_path$ created by Non-Defender Process $Image$ on $dest$. |
dest |
system |
20 |
Threat Objects
References
Detection Testing
| Test Type |
Status |
Dataset |
Source |
Sourcetype |
| Validation |
✅ Passing |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
| Unit |
✅ Passing |
Dataset |
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration |
✅ Passing |
Dataset |
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub |
Version: 1