Detection: Windows MsMpEng Writing to System32
Description
Detects MsMpEng.exe creating a file in C:\Windows\System32\.
This should never happen under normal operation Windows Defender does not install kernel drivers at runtime.
In the BlueHammer exploit, the TOCTOU race causes MsMpEng (SYSTEM) to write the attacker's driver payload directly into the drivers directory.
Search
1`sysmon`
2(EventID=15 OR EventID=11)
3Image="*\\MsMpEng.exe"
4TargetFilename="*:\\Windows\\System32\\*"
5
6| fillnull
7
8| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
9 max(_time) as lastTime
10 by Computer Image TargetFilename EventID dest dvc
11 file_hash file_name file_path action process_exec
12 process_guid process_id process_name process_path
13 signature signature_id user_id vendor_product
14
15| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
16
17| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
18
19| `windows_msmpeng_writing_to_system32_filter`
Data Source
Macros Used
| Name |
Value |
| sysmon |
(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational) |
| windows_msmpeng_writing_to_system32_filter |
search * |
windows_msmpeng_writing_to_system32_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
| ID |
Technique |
Tactic |
| T1068 |
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
Privilege Escalation |
| T1543.003 |
Windows Service |
Persistence |
Exploitation
Installation
CVE
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting |
Value |
| Disabled |
true |
| Cron Schedule |
0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time |
-70m@m |
| Latest Time |
-10m@m |
| Schedule Window |
auto |
| Creates Finding (Notable) |
Yes |
| Rule Title |
%name% |
| Rule Description |
%description% |
| Notable Event Fields |
user, dest |
| Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) |
No |
TTP detections generate a Finding (Notable) and may generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events) for associated entities.
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
No false positives have been identified at this time.
Associated Analytic Story
Finding
| Title |
Entity Field |
Entity Type |
Risk Score |
| $Image$ wrote a File or an Alternate Data Stream $TargetFilename$ on $dest$. |
dest |
system |
50 |
Threat Objects
| Field |
Type |
| Image |
process |
| TargetFilename |
file_path |
References
Detection Testing
| Test Type |
Status |
Dataset |
Source |
Sourcetype |
| Validation |
✅ Passing |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
| Unit |
✅ Passing |
Dataset |
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration |
✅ Passing |
Dataset |
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub |
Version: 1