Detection: Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share

Description

The following analytic detects executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it is commonly used by tools like PsExec/PaExec for staging binaries before creating and starting services on remote endpoints, a technique often employed for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially compromising additional systems within the network.

1`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 RelativeTargetName IN ("*.exe","*.dll") ObjectType=File ShareName IN ("\\\\*\\C$","\\\\*\\IPC$","\\\\*\\admin$") AccessMask= "0x2" 
2| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode ShareName RelativeTargetName ObjectType AccessMask src_user src_port IpAddress 
3| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  
4| `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Windows Event Log Security 5145 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Security'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter search *
executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1021 Remote Services Lateral Movement
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares Lateral Movement
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
Aquatic Panda
Ember Bear
Wizard Spider
APT28
APT3
APT32
APT39
APT41
Aquatic Panda
Blue Mockingbird
Chimera
Cinnamon Tempest
Deep Panda
FIN13
FIN8
Fox Kitten
Ke3chang
Lazarus Group
Moses Staff
Orangeworm
Play
Sandworm Team
Threat Group-1314
ToddyCat
Turla
Wizard Spider

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy.

Known False Positives

System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
$src_user$ dropped or created an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. Share name=$ShareName$, Target name=$RelativeTargetName$, and Access mask=$AccessMask$ 70 70 100
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Security XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Security XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 5