Detection: Windows CMD Evasive Patterns Through Native Commands

Description

The following analytic detects cmd.exe being used to evade defenses with nothing but built-in commands, a pattern frequently seen in ClickFix-style social engineering and malware loader activity. Adversaries abuse native cmd.exe features such as call combined with variable assignment to assemble commands piece by piece, hiding the real payload from static inspection and string-based detections. They also chain native utilities such as timeout and del to erase the dropped executable shortly after it has run, which removes evidence and complicates forensic analysis. Because these techniques need no additional tooling, they let attackers blend into routine command shell activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate a staged loader concealing its intent or cleaning up after execution.

 1
 2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
 3  count min(_time) as firstTime
 4        max(_time) as lastTime
 5
 6FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
 7
 8(
 9    Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
10    OR
11    Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe
12)
13Processes.process IN ("*call *", "*timeout *")
14NOT Processes.user IN ("SYSTEM", "*\\SYSTEM")
15
16by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
17   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
18   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
19   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
20   Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
21   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
22
23
24| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
25
26
27| eval process_lower=lower(process)
28
29
30| eval call_set_obfuscation=if(
31    like(process_lower, "%call %")
32    AND match(process, "(?i)set\\s+[\\x22\\x27]?[\\w\\-\\_]+\\s?\\="), 1, 0)
33
34
35| eval timeout_self_deletion=if(
36    like(process_lower, "%timeout %")
37    AND like(process_lower, "%del %")
38    AND (like(process_lower, "% /f%") OR like(process_lower, "% /q%"))
39    AND like(process_lower, "% exit%"), 1, 0)
40
41
42| where call_set_obfuscation=1 OR timeout_self_deletion=1
43
44
45| fields - process_lower
46
47
48| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
49
50| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
51
52| `windows_cmd_evasive_patterns_through_native_commands_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 Other 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' 'crowdstrike'
Windows Event Log Security 4688 Windows icon Windows 'XmlWinEventLog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Security'
Sysmon EventID 1 Windows icon Windows 'XmlWinEventLog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
windows_cmd_evasive_patterns_through_native_commands_filter search *
windows_cmd_evasive_patterns_through_native_commands_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Finding (Notable) No
Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) Yes
Anomaly detections generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events). They do not generate a Finding (Notable) directly.

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Legitimate batch scripts and installers may use call with variable assignment, or may delete themselves after a delay using timeout and del. Filter by parent process, user or script path as needed.

Associated Analytic Story

Intermediate Findings

Message Entity Field Entity Type Risk Score
Evasive cmd.exe command line [$process$] was executed by [$parent_process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$]. dest system 30
Evasive cmd.exe command line [$process$] was executed by [$parent_process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$]. user user 30

Threat Objects

Field Type
parent_process_name parent_process_name
process process

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation ✅ Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub |

Version: 1