| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1027.010 | Command Obfuscation | Stealth |
| T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | Execution |
| T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Stealth |
Detection: Windows Cmd Command Line With Encoded Character Sequences
Description
The following analytic detects cmd.exe command lines that contain long sequences of encoded characters, such as decimal values (12;70;18;...), hexadecimal values (0x41,0x42,...), HTML entities, or Unicode and octal escapes. This activity is significant because loaders, including ClickFix payloads that retrieve commands through finger, hide their next stage as an index list that cmd.exe decodes at runtime using delayed variable expansion before launching PowerShell. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to execution of a hidden payload, such as a download cradle with an AMSI bypass.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
3 count min(_time) as firstTime
4 max(_time) as lastTime
5
6FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
7
8(
9 Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
10 OR
11 Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe
12)
13NOT Processes.process = "*nmap*"
14NOT Processes.process = "* tsx *"
15
16by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
17 Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
18 Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
19 Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
20 Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
21 Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
22
23
24| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
25
26
27| regex process="(?i)(?:\\d{1,3}[;\\s,]){12,}
28|(?:0x[A-Fa-f0-9]{2}[;\\s,]?){12,}
29|(?:&#x?[A-Za-z0-9]{2,3}[;\\s,]?){12,}
30|(?:\\\\u[A-Fa-f0-9]{4}[;\\s,]?){12,}
31|(?:\\\\u\\{[A-Fa-f0-9]+\\}[;\\s,]?){12,}
32|(?:\\\\\\d{3}[;\\s,]?){12,}"
33
34
35| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
36
37| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
38
39| `windows_cmd_command_line_with_encoded_character_sequences_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | Other | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
| Windows Event Log Security 4688 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Security' |
|
| Sysmon EventID 1 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| security_content_summariesonly | summariesonly=summariesonly_config allow_old_summaries=oldsummaries_config fillnull_value=fillnull_config`` |
| windows_cmd_command_line_with_encoded_character_sequences_filter | search * |
windows_cmd_command_line_with_encoded_character_sequences_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time | -70m@m |
| Latest Time | -10m@m |
| Schedule Window | auto |
| Creates Finding (Notable) | Yes |
| Rule Title | %name% |
| Rule Description | %description% |
| Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
| Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) | No |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model.
Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Scripts that legitimately pass long lists of numbers, byte values or escaped characters to cmd.exe (for example network scanners, build tooling or data processing batch files) may be returned. Filter by parent process or command line as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
Finding
| Title | Entity Field | Entity Type | Risk Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| An Encoded command line [$process$] was executed by [$parent_process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$]. | dest | system | 50 |
Threat Objects
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
| parent_process_name | parent_process_name |
| process | process |
References
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub |
Version: 1