Detection: Windows Cmd Command Line With Encoded Character Sequences

Description

The following analytic detects cmd.exe command lines that contain long sequences of encoded characters, such as decimal values (12;70;18;...), hexadecimal values (0x41,0x42,...), HTML entities, or Unicode and octal escapes. This activity is significant because loaders, including ClickFix payloads that retrieve commands through finger, hide their next stage as an index list that cmd.exe decodes at runtime using delayed variable expansion before launching PowerShell. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to execution of a hidden payload, such as a download cradle with an AMSI bypass.

 1
 2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
 3  count min(_time) as firstTime
 4        max(_time) as lastTime
 5
 6FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
 7
 8(
 9    Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
10    OR
11    Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe
12)
13NOT Processes.process = "*nmap*"
14NOT Processes.process = "* tsx *"
15
16by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
17   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
18   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
19   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
20   Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
21   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
22
23
24| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
25
26
27| regex process="(?i)(?:\\d{1,3}[;\\s,]){12,}
28|(?:0x[A-Fa-f0-9]{2}[;\\s,]?){12,}
29|(?:&#x?[A-Za-z0-9]{2,3}[;\\s,]?){12,}
30|(?:\\\\u[A-Fa-f0-9]{4}[;\\s,]?){12,}
31|(?:\\\\u\\{[A-Fa-f0-9]+\\}[;\\s,]?){12,}
32|(?:\\\\\\d{3}[;\\s,]?){12,}"
33
34
35| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
36
37| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
38
39| `windows_cmd_command_line_with_encoded_character_sequences_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 Other 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' 'crowdstrike'
Windows Event Log Security 4688 Windows icon Windows 'XmlWinEventLog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Security'
Sysmon EventID 1 Windows icon Windows 'XmlWinEventLog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_summariesonly summariesonly=summariesonly_config allow_old_summaries=oldsummaries_config fillnull_value=fillnull_config``
windows_cmd_command_line_with_encoded_character_sequences_filter search *
windows_cmd_command_line_with_encoded_character_sequences_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Finding (Notable) Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) No
TTP detections generate a Finding (Notable) and may generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events) for associated entities.

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Scripts that legitimately pass long lists of numbers, byte values or escaped characters to cmd.exe (for example network scanners, build tooling or data processing batch files) may be returned. Filter by parent process or command line as needed.

Associated Analytic Story

Finding

Title Entity Field Entity Type Risk Score
An Encoded command line [$process$] was executed by [$parent_process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$]. dest system 50

Threat Objects

Field Type
parent_process_name parent_process_name
process process

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation ✅ Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub |

Version: 1