| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1059.007 | JavaScript | Execution |
Detection: Windows Node.exe Executing JS Script In Immediate Folder
Description
The following analytic identifies node.exe directly executing a single .js script located in the same directory it was launched from, where that directory is an unusual location such as a user profile, PerfLogs, ProgramData, or Temp folder.
Legitimate Node.js application, module, and package manager directories are excluded.
This pattern is commonly associated with malware loaders and second-stage payloads that leverage the Node.js runtime to execute JavaScript outside of a typical development or application context.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
3 count min(_time) as firstTime
4 max(_time) as lastTime
5
6FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
7
8(
9 Processes.process_name="node.exe"
10 OR
11 Processes.original_file_name="node.exe"
12)
13Processes.process="*js"
14Processes.process_path IN (
15 "*:\\PerfLogs\\*",
16 "*:\\ProgramData\\*",
17 "*:\\Temp\\*",
18 "*:\\Users\\*"
19)
20(
21 NOT Processes.process_path IN (
22 "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*",
23 "*\\node\\*",
24 "*\\nodejs\\*",
25 "*\\nvm\\*"
26 )
27 AND
28 (
29 NOT Processes.process_path = "*\\AppData\\Local\\*"
30 OR
31 Processes.process_path = "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*"
32 )
33)
34
35by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
36 Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
37 Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
38 Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
39 Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
40 Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
41 Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
42 Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id
43 Processes.process_current_directory Processes.vendor_product
44
45
46| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
47
48
49| eval process_args=split(process, " ")
50
51| eval script_name=mvindex(process_args, 1)
52
53| eval process_args_count=mvcount(process_args)
54
55| regex script_name="(?i)^[^\\\/]+\.js$"
56
57| where like(process_path, process_current_directory.process_name) AND process_args_count=2
58
59
60| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
61
62| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
63
64| `windows_node_exe_executing_js_script_in_immediate_folder_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sysmon EventID 1 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
|
| CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | Other | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
| Windows Event Log Security 4688 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Security' |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| security_content_summariesonly | summariesonly=summariesonly_config allow_old_summaries=oldsummaries_config fillnull_value=fillnull_config`` |
| windows_node_exe_executing_js_script_in_immediate_folder_filter | search * |
windows_node_exe_executing_js_script_in_immediate_folder_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time | -70m@m |
| Latest Time | -10m@m |
| Schedule Window | auto |
| Creates Finding (Notable) | Yes |
| Rule Title | %name% |
| Rule Description | %description% |
| Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
| Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) | No |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are
designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this
search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must
ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons
that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model.
Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Legitimate custom Node.js tooling or utility scripts that are intentionally placed and executed from a user profile, PerfLogs, ProgramData, or Temp directory may trigger this analytic.
Associated Analytic Story
Finding
| Title | Entity Field | Entity Type | Risk Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| Node.exe executed script [$script_name$] from an unusual directory on [$dest$] | dest | system | 50 |
Threat Objects
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
| script_name | file_name |
| process | process |
References
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub |
Version: 1