Analytics Story: Scattered Spider
Description
Detects tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) associated with Scattered Spider (UNC3944, Octo Tempest, Storm-0875), a sophisticated cybercriminal group targeting large enterprises through advanced social engineering and legitimate tool abuse. This analytic story provides comprehensive detection coverage for their complete attack chain, from initial social engineering campaigns through data exfiltration and ransomware deployment. The group is known for bypassing traditional security controls by abusing legitimate remote access tools like TeamViewer, AnyDesk, and Ngrok, while conducting sophisticated vishing operations to compromise IT helpdesks and steal MFA tokens.
Recent intelligence from the July 2025 CISA advisory reveals significant evolution in their capabilities, including deployment of DragonForce ransomware, enhanced Snowflake database targeting for rapid data exfiltration, and advanced cloud infrastructure exploitation. The analytics in this story detect their signature behaviors including MFA bombing attacks, unauthorized remote access tool deployment, cloud API abuse, credential harvesting with tools like Mimikatz, and their unique operational security practices of monitoring victim communications to evade detection. Coverage includes process monitoring, network analytics, cloud API detection, and behavioral correlation rules designed to identify the subtle indicators that traditional signature-based tools miss while providing actionable intelligence for incident response teams.
Why it matters
Scattered Spider represents a critical threat to enterprise security, utilizing sophisticated social engineering to bypass technical controls and gain initial access to large organizations. Unlike traditional cybercriminals who rely on malware, this group exploits human psychology and abuses legitimate administrative tools, making detection extremely challenging. Their attacks result in significant business disruption through data theft, ransomware deployment, and operational downtime. Recent evolution includes advanced cloud targeting capabilities and VMware ESXi encryption, posing escalating risks to critical infrastructure and cloud-dependent organizations. Organizations must implement behavioral detection capabilities and enhanced user training to defend against these advanced persistent social engineering campaigns.
Detections
Data Sources
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
Cisco Network Visibility Module Flow Data | cisco:nvm:flowdata |
not_applicable |
|
Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Connection Event | N/A | cisco:sfw:estreamer |
not_applicable |
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | N/A | crowdstrike:events:sensor |
crowdstrike |
Palo Alto Network Traffic | pan:traffic |
screenconnect_palo_traffic |
|
Powershell Script Block Logging 4104 | XmlWinEventLog |
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational |
|
Sysmon EventID 1 | XmlWinEventLog |
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
|
Sysmon EventID 11 | XmlWinEventLog |
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
|
Sysmon EventID 13 | XmlWinEventLog |
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
|
Sysmon EventID 22 | XmlWinEventLog |
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
|
Windows Event Log Security 4663 | XmlWinEventLog |
XmlWinEventLog:Security |
|
Windows Event Log Security 4688 | XmlWinEventLog |
XmlWinEventLog:Security |
References
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-320a
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015/
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/scattered-spider-attempts-to-avoid-detection-with-bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver-tactic/
- https://www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/scattered-spider-the-modus-operandi.html
Source: GitHub | Version: 1