Analytics Story: Lotus Blossom Chrysalis Backdoor
Description
Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate activities related to Lotus Blossom's Chrysalis backdoor supply chain attack. Monitor for DLL side-loading abuse of Bitdefender Submission Wizard, TinyCC shellcode execution with suspicious command-line flags, BluetoothService persistence in user directories, and system information collection via whoami/systeminfo commands. Investigate unusual process execution patterns, NSIS installer deployments to suspicious paths, and malicious service installations. Combining behavioral detections with threat intelligence enables early identification of Lotus Blossom tradecraft, including custom loaders, Microsoft Warbird abuse, and C2 communications mimicking legitimate API traffic patterns.
Why it matters
Lotus Blossom (Billbug) is a Chinese APT group active since 2009, targeting government, telecom, aviation, and critical infrastructure sectors across Southeast Asia and Central America. In June 2025, the group compromised Notepad++ hosting provider infrastructure, redirecting update traffic to malicious servers until December 2025. Kaspersky and Rapid7 identified three distinct infection chains delivering the custom Chrysalis backdoor. Chain #1 exploited ProShow software vulnerability to launch Metasploit downloaders. Chain #2 abused Lua interpreter to execute shellcode via EnumWindowStationsW. Chain #3 deployed DLL side-loading using renamed Bitdefender Submission Wizard (BluetoothService.exe) to load encrypted shellcode. All chains collected system information via whoami, tasklist, systeminfo, and netstat commands, exfiltrating results to temp.sh hosting service. Alternative loaders include TinyCC abuse for shellcode compilation and Microsoft Warbird exploitation. The malware establishes persistence through Windows services while C2 communications mimic legitimate API traffic. Victims included government organizations in the Philippines, financial institutions in El Salvador, and IT service providers in Vietnam. Lotus Blossom also deploys Cobalt Strike beacons and Metasploit shellcode as secondary payloads. Splunk ESCU provides detection coverage for these commodity frameworks in the Cobalt Strike and Compromised Windows Host analytic stories.
Detections
Data Sources
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | Other | crowdstrike:events:sensor |
crowdstrike |
| Sysmon EventID 1 | XmlWinEventLog |
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
|
| Sysmon EventID 7 | XmlWinEventLog |
XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
|
| Windows Event Log Security 4688 | XmlWinEventLog |
XmlWinEventLog:Security |
|
| Windows Event Log System 7045 | XmlWinEventLog |
XmlWinEventLog:System |
References
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/
- https://securelist.com/notepad-supply-chain-attack/118708/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065/
Source: GitHub | Version: 1