| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|
Detection: Remote Registry Key modifications
REMOVED DETECTION
This detection has been removed from the Splunk Threat Research content library and is no longer maintained or supported.
Reason: Detection deprecated as it no longer effectively identifies the intended malicious activity
Removed in version: 5.2.0
If you have any questions or concerns, please reach out to us at research@splunk.com.
Description
This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="\\\\*" by Registry.dest , Registry.user
3| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
5| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
6| `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sysmon EventID 13 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| security_content_summariesonly | summariesonly=summariesonly_config allow_old_summaries=oldsummaries_config fillnull_value=fillnull_config`` |
| remote_registry_key_modifications_filter | `` |
remote_registry_key_modifications_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | N/A |
| Earliest Time | N/A |
| Latest Time | N/A |
| Schedule Window | N/A |
| Creates Finding (Notable) | No |
| Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) | No |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.
Known False Positives
This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.
Associated Analytic Story
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | Not Applicable | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | Not Applicable | N/A | N/A |
N/A |
| Integration | Not Applicable | N/A | N/A |
N/A |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub |
Version: 6