Detection: Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703

REMOVED DETECTION

This detection has been removed from the Splunk Threat Research content library and is no longer maintained or supported.

Reason: Updated to a new detection name

Removed in version: 5.2.0

Replacement: Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging

If you have any questions or concerns, please reach out to us at research@splunk.com.

Description

This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective.

1`wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe 
2| rex field=Message "Enabled Privileges:\s+(?<privs>\w+)\s+Disabled Privileges:" 
3| where privs="SeDebugPrivilege" 
4| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message 
5| rename privs as "Enabled Privilege" 
6| rename Process_Name as process 
7|  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
8| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
9| `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`

Data Source

No data sources specified for this detection.

Macros Used

Name Value
wineventlog_security eventtype="wineventlog_security" OR Channel="security" OR source="XmlWinEventLog:Security" OR source="WinEventLog:Security"
detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter ``
detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1003.001 LSASS Memory Credential Access

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule N/A
Earliest Time N/A
Latest Time N/A
Schedule Window N/A
Creates Finding (Notable) No
Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) No
TTP detections generate a Finding (Notable) and may generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events) for associated entities.

Implementation

You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators" to be able to look for the right group membership changes.

Known False Positives

The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.

Associated Analytic Story

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Not Applicable N/A N/A N/A
Unit Not Applicable N/A N/A N/A
Integration Not Applicable N/A N/A N/A

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub |

Version: 5