ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1055 | Process Injection | Defense Evasion |
Detection: Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments
Description
The following analytic detects instances of DLLHost.exe executing without command line arguments. This behavior is unusual and often associated with malicious activities, such as those performed by Cobalt Strike. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because DLLHost.exe typically requires arguments to function correctly, and its absence may indicate an attempt to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized actions like credential dumping or file manipulation, posing a severe threat to the environment.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dllhost` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
6| regex process="(?i)(dllhost\.exe.{0,4}$)"
7| `suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | N/A | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
Sysmon EventID 1 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Windows Event Log Security 4688 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Security' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
process_dllhost | (Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=dllhost.exe) |
suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter | search * |
suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
Suspicious dllhost.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ | 49 | 70 | 70 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 6