Detection: Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path

Description

The following analytic detects the execution of native .NET binaries from non-standard directories within the Windows operating system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, comparing process names and original file names against a predefined lookup using the is_net_windows_file_macro macro. This activity is significant because adversaries may move .NET binaries to unconventional paths to evade detection and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\Windows\\ADWS\\*","*\\Windows\\SysWOW64*", "*\\Windows\\system32*", "*\\Windows\\NetworkController\\*", "*\\Windows\\SystemApps\\*", "*\\WinSxS\\*", "*\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
3| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
6| `is_net_windows_file_macro` 
7| `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source Supported App
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 N/A 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' 'crowdstrike' N/A

Macros Used

Name Value
is_net_windows_file_macro `lookup update=true is_net_windows_file filename as process_name OUTPUT netFile
windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter search *
windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1036 Masquerading Defense Evasion
T1036.003 Rename System Utilities Defense Evasion
T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution Defense Evasion
T1218.004 InstallUtil Defense Evasion
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT28
APT32
BRONZE BUTLER
Dragonfly
FIN13
LazyScripter
Nomadic Octopus
OilRig
PLATINUM
Sandworm Team
TA551
TeamTNT
Windshift
ZIRCONIUM
menuPass
APT32
GALLIUM
Lazarus Group
menuPass
Lazarus Group
Mustang Panda
menuPass

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. 49 70 70
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 3