ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1547.010 | Port Monitors | Persistence |
T1547 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | Privilege Escalation |
Detection: Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors
Description
The following analytic detects modifications to the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors
. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on events where the registry path is modified. This activity is significant because attackers can exploit this registry key to load arbitrary .dll files, which will execute with elevated SYSTEM permissions and persist after a reboot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute code with high privileges, and potentially compromise the entire system.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
6| `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
Sysmon EventID 12 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Sysmon EventID 13 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter | search * |
monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the offical Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
Known False Positives
You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
New print monitor added on $dest$ | 64 | 80 | 80 |
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 7