Detection: Suspicious Process Executed From Container File

Description

The following analytic identifies a suspicious process executed from within common container/archive file types such as ZIP, ISO, IMG, and others. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by adversaries to execute scripts or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.

Search

  1
  2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN ("*.ZIP\\*","*.ISO\\*","*.IMG\\*","*.CAB\\*","*.TAR\\*","*.GZ\\*","*.RAR\\*","*.7Z\\*") AND Processes.action="allowed" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.user
  3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
  4| regex process="(?i).*(ZIP
  5|ISO
  6|IMG
  7|CAB
  8|TAR
  9|GZ
 10|RAR
 11|7Z)\\\\.+\.(BAT
 12|BIN
 13|CAB
 14|CMD
 15|COM
 16|CPL
 17|EX_
 18|EXE
 19|GADGET
 20|INF1
 21|INS
 22|INX
 23|
 24|HTM
 25|HTML
 26|ISU
 27|JAR
 28|JOB
 29|JS
 30|JSE
 31|LNK
 32|MSC
 33|MSI
 34|MSP
 35|MST
 36|PAF
 37|PIF
 38|PS1
 39|REG
 40|RGS
 41|SCR
 42|SCT
 43|SHB
 44|SHS
 45|U3P
 46|VB
 47|VBE
 48|VBS
 49|VBSCRIPT
 50|WS
 51|WSF
 52|WSH)\"?$" 
 53| rex field=process "(?i).+\\\\(?<file_name>[^\\\]+\.(ZIP
 54|ISO
 55|IMG
 56|CAB
 57|TAR
 58|GZ
 59|RAR
 60|7Z))\\\\((.+\\\\)+)?(?<process_name>.+\.(BAT
 61|BIN
 62|CAB
 63|CMD
 64|COM
 65|CPL
 66|EX_
 67|EXE
 68|GADGET
 69|INF1
 70|INS
 71|INX
 72|
 73|HTM
 74|HTML
 75|ISU
 76|JAR
 77|JOB
 78|JS
 79|JSE
 80|LNK
 81|MSC
 82|MSI
 83|MSP
 84|MST
 85|PAF
 86|PIF
 87|PS1
 88|REG
 89|RGS
 90|SCR
 91|SCT
 92|SHB
 93|SHS
 94|U3P
 95|VB
 96|VBE
 97|VBS
 98|VBSCRIPT
 99|WS
100|WSF
101|WSH))\"?$"
102| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
103| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
104| `suspicious_process_executed_from_container_file_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2	N/A	'crowdstrike:events:sensor'	'crowdstrike'
Sysmon EventID 1	Windows	'xmlwineventlog'	'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
Windows Event Log Security 4688	Windows	'xmlwineventlog'	'XmlWinEventLog:Security'

Macros Used

Annotations

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Various business process or userland applications and behavior.

Associated Analytic Story

• Amadey

• Remcos

• Snake Keylogger

• Unusual Processes

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

References

• https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/tracking-evolution-gootloader-operations

• https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/weaponizing-disk-image-files-analysis/

• https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/

Detection Testing

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 3