Detection: Windows Routing and Remote Access Service Registry Key Change

Updated Date: 2026-03-24 ID: a93df51e-e612-40b7-a105-33e288160575 Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk Type: Anomaly Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

This analytic identifies the modification of the Windows RemoteAccess Registry Entry. This technique can be used by malware, adversaries, threat actors and red teamers to gain persistence on a system by tampering with the key to add a custom DLL to be loaded. This technique was also observed to be used by Gh0st RAT malware. Upon seeing this behavior, it is recommended to review the system services events especially the remote access services.

Search

 1
 2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
 3  count min(_time) as firstTime
 4        max(_time) as lastTime
 5
 6FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE
 7
 8Registry.registry_path="*\\Services\\RemoteAccess\\RouterManagers\\Ip*"
 9Registry.action=modified
10
11by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid
12   Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive
13   Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
14   Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name
15   Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status
16   Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
17
18
19| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
20
21| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
22
23| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
24
25| `windows_routing_and_remote_access_service_registry_key_change_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source
Sysmon EventID 13	Windows	`'XmlWinEventLog'`	`'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'`

Macros Used

Name	Value
security_content_ctime	`convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)`
windows_routing_and_remote_access_service_registry_key_change_filter	`search *`

windows_routing_and_remote_access_service_registry_key_change_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK

+ Kill Chain Phases

+ NIST

+ CIS

- Threat Actors

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1112	Modify Registry	Defense Evasion

Exploitation

Installation

DE.AE

CIS 10

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting	Value
Disabled	true
Cron Schedule	`0 * * * *`
Earliest Time	`-70m@m`
Latest Time	`-10m@m`
Schedule Window	`auto`
Creates Risk Event	True

This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint datamodel in the Registry node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.

Known False Positives

There are legitimate reasons for changing this registry key/value. Investigate the change and its source and apply appropriate filters as needed.

Associated Analytic Story

Gh0st RAT

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message:

Routing and Remote Access Service registry key [$registry_path$] was modified with the value [$registry_value_data$] by [$user$] on [$dest$].

Risk Object	Risk Object Type	Risk Score	Threat Objects
dest	system	20	registry_path

References

Detection Testing

Test Type	Status	Dataset	Source	Sourcetype
Validation	✅ Passing	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational`	`XmlWinEventLog`
Integration	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational`	`XmlWinEventLog`

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 1