| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1082 | System Information Discovery | Discovery |
| T1046 | Network Service Discovery | Discovery |
| T1018 | Remote System Discovery | Discovery |
Detection: Windows PsTools Recon Usage
EXPERIMENTAL DETECTION
This detection status is set to experimental. The Splunk Threat Research team has not yet fully tested, simulated, or built comprehensive datasets for this detection. As such, this analytic is not officially supported. If you have any questions or concerns, please reach out to us at research@splunk.com.
Description
The following analytic identifies execution of Sysinternals PsTools and Sysinternals Suit binaries that are commonly used for reconnaissance and information gathering on Windows endpoints. PsTools (PsExec, PsFile, PsGetSid, PsInfo, PsPing, etc.) or Sysinternals Suit tools, are frequently used by administrators for legitimate maintenance but are also leveraged by threat actors to collect system, account, network and service information during discovery and lateral movement. This detection focuses on process execution and PE metadata telemetry (OriginalFileName). If confirmed malicious, this activity can indicate targeted reconnaissance and foothold escalation, enabling subsequent lateral movement or credential abuse.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
3 count min(_time) as firstTime
4 max(_time) as lastTime
5
6 from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
7
8 Processes.process_name IN (
9 "PsGetsid.exe",
10 "PsGetsid64.exe",
11 "PsInfo.exe",
12 "PsInfo64.exe",
13 "pslist.exe",
14 "pslist64.exe",
15 "PsLoggedon.exe",
16 "PsLoggedon64.exe",
17 "psloglist.exe",
18 "psloglist64.exe",
19 "PsPing.exe",
20 "PsPing64.exe",
21 "PsService.exe",
22 "PsService64.exe",
23 "Tcpvcon.exe",
24 "Tcpvcon64.exe",
25 "Tcpvcon64a.exe"
26 )
27 OR
28 Processes.original_file_name IN (
29 "PsGetSid.exe",
30 "Psinfo.exe",
31 "pslist.exe",
32 "psloggedon.exe",
33 "psloglist.exe",
34 "psping.exe",
35 "psservice.exe",
36 "Tcpvcon.exe"
37 )
38
39by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
40 Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
41 Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
42 Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id
43 Processes.vendor_product
44
45
46| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
47
48| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
49
50| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
51
52| `windows_pstools_recon_usage_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | N/A | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
| Sysmon EventID 1 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
|
| Windows Event Log Security 4688 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Security' |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
| windows_pstools_recon_usage_filter | search * |
windows_pstools_recon_usage_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time | -70m@m |
| Latest Time | -10m@m |
| Schedule Window | auto |
| Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Legitimate administrators commonly use PsTools for troubleshooting and management. False positives are likely in environments where PsTools are an approved operational toolset, or where automated management systems invoke them. Tune by whitelisting approved management hosts, service accounts, and scheduled maintenance windows.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message:
PsTools binary $process_name$ was executed on host $dest$.
| Risk Object | Risk Object Type | Risk Score | Threat Objects |
|---|---|---|---|
| dest | system | 30 | process_name |
| user | user | 25 | process_name |
References
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | Not Applicable | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 2