| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1559 | Inter-Process Communication | Execution |
| T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Lateral Movement |
| T1055 | Process Injection | Defense Evasion |
Detection: Windows PUA Named Pipe
Description
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to named pipes used by potentially unwanted applications (PUAs) like VPNs or utilities like PsExec. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
Search
1`sysmon`
2(EventCode=17 OR EventCode=18)
3NOT process_path IN (
4 "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Adobe*",
5 "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Google*",
6 "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft*",
7 "*:\\Program Files\\Adobe*",
8 "*:\\Program Files\\dotnet\\dotnet.exe",
9 "*:\\Program Files\\Google*",
10 "*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft*",
11 "*:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
12 "*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
13 "*:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft*",
14 "*\\Amazon\\SSM\\Instance*",
15 "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google*",
16 "*\\AppData\\Local\\Kingsoft\\*",
17 "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft*",
18 "System"
19)
20
21
22| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
23count by dest dvc process_exec process_guid process_id process_path signature signature_id
24vendor_product pipe_name user_id Image process_name
25
26
27| lookup pua_named_pipes pua_pipe_name AS pipe_name OUTPUT tool, description
28
29| where isnotnull(tool)
30
31| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
32
33| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
34
35| `windows_pua_named_pipe_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sysmon EventID 17 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
|
| Sysmon EventID 18 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
| windows_pua_named_pipe_filter | search * |
windows_pua_named_pipe_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time | -70m@m |
| Latest Time | -10m@m |
| Schedule Window | auto |
| Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
Known False Positives
PUAs can be used in a legitimate manner. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message:
An instance of $process_name$ located in $process_path$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ accessing known named pipe $pipe_name$ from a potentially unwanted application in your environment.
| Risk Object | Risk Object Type | Risk Score | Threat Objects |
|---|---|---|---|
| dest | system | 72 | process_name |
References
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 1