| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | Execution |
| T1176.001 | Browser Extensions | Persistence |
Detection: Windows Native Messaging Host Spawns User Writable Process
Description
The following analytic detects a process located in a user-writable directory (C:\Users, C:\ProgramData or C:\PerfLogs) that is spawned by cmd.exe acting as a Chromium native messaging host launcher. This activity is significant because attackers register a malicious native messaging host so that a browser extension can run batch scripts and binaries such as a bundled Python interpreter on demand, giving them a stealthy command and control and persistence channel. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, perform discovery and run further payloads under the context of the logged-in user. Known legitimate native hosts are excluded.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
3 count min(_time) as firstTime
4 max(_time) as lastTime
5
6FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
7
8Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe"
9Processes.parent_process = "*chrome-extension://*"
10Processes.parent_process = "*\\pipe\\chrome.nativeMessaging*"
11Processes.process_path IN (
12 "*:\\PerfLogs\\*",
13 "*:\\ProgramData\\*",
14 "*:\\Users\\*"
15)
16NOT Processes.process = "*chrome-extension://*"
17NOT Processes.process = "*\\pipe\\chrome.nativeMessaging*"
18NOT (
19 Processes.process_name = "claude.exe"
20 Processes.process = "*--chrome-native-host*"
21 )
22NOT (
23 Processes.process_name = "IPS3.exe"
24 Processes.process = "* nativemessaging*"
25 )
26
27by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
28 Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
29 Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
30 Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
31 Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
32 Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
33
34
35| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
36
37| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
38
39| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
40
41| `windows_native_messaging_host_spawns_user_writable_process_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | Other | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
| Windows Event Log Security 4688 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Security' |
|
| Sysmon EventID 1 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
| windows_native_messaging_host_spawns_user_writable_process_filter | search * |
windows_native_messaging_host_spawns_user_writable_process_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time | -70m@m |
| Latest Time | -10m@m |
| Schedule Window | auto |
| Creates Finding (Notable) | Yes |
| Rule Title | %name% |
| Rule Description | %description% |
| Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
| Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) | No |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Software that ships its own native messaging host binary in the user profile or ProgramData and launches it through a cmd.exe wrapper may be returned. Validate the extension and the native host, then add the process name and command line to the exclusion list.
Associated Analytic Story
Finding
| Title | Entity Field | Entity Type | Risk Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| The process [$process_name$] was spawned by a Chromium native messaging host launcher [$parent_process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$]. | dest | system | 50 |
Threat Objects
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
| process | process |
| parent_process | process |
References
-
https://specterops.io/blog/2026/08/13/chromium-extension-c2-persistence/
-
https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/develop/concepts/native-messaging
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub |
Version: 1