Detection: Windows Native Messaging Host Spawns User Writable Process

Description

The following analytic detects a process located in a user-writable directory (C:\Users, C:\ProgramData or C:\PerfLogs) that is spawned by cmd.exe acting as a Chromium native messaging host launcher. This activity is significant because attackers register a malicious native messaging host so that a browser extension can run batch scripts and binaries such as a bundled Python interpreter on demand, giving them a stealthy command and control and persistence channel. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, perform discovery and run further payloads under the context of the logged-in user. Known legitimate native hosts are excluded.

 1
 2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
 3  count min(_time) as firstTime
 4        max(_time) as lastTime
 5
 6FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
 7
 8Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe"
 9Processes.parent_process = "*chrome-extension://*"
10Processes.parent_process = "*\\pipe\\chrome.nativeMessaging*"
11Processes.process_path IN (
12    "*:\\PerfLogs\\*",
13    "*:\\ProgramData\\*",
14    "*:\\Users\\*"
15)
16NOT Processes.process = "*chrome-extension://*"
17NOT Processes.process = "*\\pipe\\chrome.nativeMessaging*"
18NOT (
19        Processes.process_name = "claude.exe"
20        Processes.process = "*--chrome-native-host*"
21    )
22NOT (
23        Processes.process_name = "IPS3.exe"
24        Processes.process = "* nativemessaging*"
25    )
26
27by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
28   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
29   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
30   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
31   Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
32   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
33
34
35| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
36
37| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
38
39| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
40
41| `windows_native_messaging_host_spawns_user_writable_process_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 Other 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' 'crowdstrike'
Windows Event Log Security 4688 Windows icon Windows 'XmlWinEventLog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Security'
Sysmon EventID 1 Windows icon Windows 'XmlWinEventLog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
windows_native_messaging_host_spawns_user_writable_process_filter search *
windows_native_messaging_host_spawns_user_writable_process_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Finding (Notable) Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) No
TTP detections generate a Finding (Notable) and may generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events) for associated entities.

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Software that ships its own native messaging host binary in the user profile or ProgramData and launches it through a cmd.exe wrapper may be returned. Validate the extension and the native host, then add the process name and command line to the exclusion list.

Associated Analytic Story

Finding

Title Entity Field Entity Type Risk Score
The process [$process_name$] was spawned by a Chromium native messaging host launcher [$parent_process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$]. dest system 50

Threat Objects

Field Type
process process
parent_process process

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation ✅ Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub |

Version: 1