Detection: Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load

Updated Date: 2024-05-15 ID: 8351340b-ac0e-41ec-8b07-dd01bf32d6ea Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk Type: Anomaly Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

The following analytic detects a process loading a version.dll file from a directory other than %windir%\system32 or %windir%\syswow64. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where an unsigned or improperly located version.dll is loaded. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used in ransomware and APT malware campaigns, including Brute Ratel C4, to execute malicious code via DLL side loading. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and potentially compromise the target host.

1`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = "*\\version.dll" AND (Signed = "false" OR NOT(ImageLoaded IN("*\\windows\\system32*",  "*\\windows\\syswow64\\*"))) 
2| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId 
3| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
5| `windows_hijack_execution_flow_version_dll_side_load_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source Supported App
Sysmon EventID 7 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' N/A

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
windows_hijack_execution_flow_version_dll_side_load_filter search *
windows_hijack_execution_flow_version_dll_side_load_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1574.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking Defense Evasion
T1574 Hijack Execution Flow Persistence
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
KillChainPhase.INSTALLATION
NistCategory.DE_AE
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT41
Aquatic Panda
BackdoorDiplomacy
Cinnamon Tempest
Evilnum
RTM
Threat Group-3390
Tonto Team
Whitefly
menuPass

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.

Implementation

The latest Sysmon TA 3.0 https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709 will add the ImageLoaded name to the process_name field, allowing this query to work. Use as an example and implement for other products.

Known False Positives

unknown

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
a process $Image$ loading $ImageLoaded$ as a side load dll in $dest$ 35 50 70
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation ✅ Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 2