Detection: Windows AD User Suspicious UPN Change

Description

The following analytic detects a user account modifying its own userPrincipalName (UPN) to match the sAMAccountName of another account via Windows Security Event 4738. This is the setup step of the ResetNightmare attack (CVE-2026-27912), where an attacker with WriteProperty rights on their own UPN attribute spoofs their identity to a target account. The KDC then resolves a ptype=10 (NT-ENTERPRISE) Kerberos pre-authentication request against the spoofed UPN, issuing a kadmin/changepw TGT that can be used to change the target account's password via kpasswd (port 464). Event 4738 is generated when a user account attribute is changed. This analytic filters to events where the SubjectUserSid equals the TargetSid (self-modification), the new UPN value is not a standard UPN (no @ sign), and the value is not a Windows placeholder. A non-UPN value set on one's own account is anomalous and has no legitimate administrative use case.

 1`wineventlog_security`
 2EventCode=4738
 3UserPrincipalName="*"
 4NOT UserPrincipalName IN (
 5    "-",
 6    "",
 7    "*@*",
 8    "%%1793"
 9)
10NOT SubjectUserSid IN (
11    "S-1-5-18",
12    "S-1-5-7"
13)
14NOT SubjectUserName IN (
15    "ANONYMOUS*",
16    "NT AUTHORITY*"
17)
18
19
20| where SubjectUserSid=TargetSid
21
22
23| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
24              max(_time) as lastTime
25
26  by dest SubjectUserName SubjectUserSid TargetUserName TargetSid UserPrincipalName
27
28
29| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
30
31| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
32
33| `windows_ad_user_suspicious_upn_change_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Windows Event Log Security 4738 Windows icon Windows 'XmlWinEventLog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Security'

Macros Used

Name Value
wineventlog_security eventtype="wineventlog_security" OR Channel="security" OR source="XmlWinEventLog:Security" OR source="WinEventLog:Security"
windows_ad_user_suspicious_upn_change_filter search *
windows_ad_user_suspicious_upn_change_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1078.002 Domain Accounts Initial Access
Installation
Delivery
Exploitation
DE.CM
CIS 10

CVE

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Finding (Notable) Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) No
TTP detections generate a Finding (Notable) and may generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events) for associated entities.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting User Account Management within Account Management needs to be enabled.

Known False Positives

Administrators or identity management tools may legitimately set a UPN that does not contain an @ sign during account provisioning or migration workflows. Investigate the SubjectUserName and context to confirm.

Associated Analytic Story

Finding

Title Entity Field Entity Type Risk Score
User [$SubjectUserName$] set their UPN to [$UserPrincipalName$] on $dest$ SubjectUserName user 50

Threat Objects

Field Type
SubjectUserName user

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation ✅ Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Security XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Security XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub |

Version: 1