Detection: Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory

Description

The following analytic identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute binaries or scripts from public directories, such as users\public, \programdata, or \windows\temp, using schtasks.exe with the /create command. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 1 data to detect this behavior. This activity is significant because it often indicates an attempt to maintain persistence or execute malicious scripts, which are common tactics in malware deployment. If confirmed as malicious, this could lead to data compromise, unauthorized access, and potential lateral movement within the network.

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\users\\public\\* OR Processes.process=*\\programdata\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\temp*)  Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
6| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source Supported App
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 N/A 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' 'crowdstrike' N/A

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter search *
suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1053.005 Scheduled Task Execution
T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Persistence
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
KillChainPhase.INSTALLATION
NistCategory.DE_AE
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT-C-36
APT29
APT3
APT32
APT33
APT37
APT38
APT39
APT41
BITTER
BRONZE BUTLER
Blue Mockingbird
Chimera
Cobalt Group
Confucius
Dragonfly
FIN10
FIN13
FIN6
FIN7
FIN8
Fox Kitten
GALLIUM
Gamaredon Group
HEXANE
Higaisa
Kimsuky
Lazarus Group
LuminousMoth
Machete
Magic Hound
Molerats
MuddyWater
Mustang Panda
Naikon
OilRig
Patchwork
Rancor
Silence
Stealth Falcon
TA2541
ToddyCat
Wizard Spider
menuPass
Earth Lusca

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

The main source of false positives could be the legitimate use of scheduled tasks from these directories. Careful tuning of this search may be necessary to suit the specifics of your environment, reducing the rate of false positives.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
Suspicious scheduled task registered on $dest$ from Public Directory 35 70 50
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 2