Detection: Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File

Description

The following analytic detects suspicious command lines that append user entries to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny files. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving these files. This activity is significant because altering these configuration files can allow attackers to schedule tasks with elevated permissions, facilitating persistence on a compromised Linux host. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code at scheduled intervals, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/at.allow", "*/etc/at.deny") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
6| `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source Supported App
Sysmon for Linux EventID 1 Linux icon Linux 'sysmon:linux' 'Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational' N/A

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter search *
linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1053.002 At Execution
T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Persistence
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
KillChainPhase.INSTALLATION
NistCategory.DE_AE
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT18
BRONZE BUTLER
Threat Group-3390
Earth Lusca

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$ 9 30 30
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational sysmon:linux
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational sysmon:linux

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 3