Detection: Windows Cloud Files Filter Loaded by Uncommon Process

Description

The following analytic detects "cldapi.dll" being loaded by a process not associated with legitimate cloud sync activity. The Windows Cloud Files API (cldapi.dll) is abused by several local privilege escalation exploits.

 1`sysmon`
 2EventID=7
 3ImageLoaded="*\\cldapi.dll"
 4NOT Image IN (
 5    "*\\box.exe",
 6    "*\\dropbox.exe",
 7    "*\\googledrivefs.exe",
 8    "*\\icloud.exe",
 9    "*\\onedrive*.exe",
10    "C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
11    "C:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
12    "C:\\Windows\\Syswow64\\*",
13    "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*"
14)
15
16
17| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
18                max(_time) as lastTime
19
20  by dest loaded_file_path loaded_file
21     process_path process_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id
22     service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified
23     signature signature_id user_id vendor_product
24
25
26| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
27
28| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
29
30| `windows_cloud_files_filter_loaded_by_uncommon_process_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Sysmon EventID 7 Windows icon Windows 'XmlWinEventLog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
sysmon (source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR source=Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational)
windows_cloud_files_filter_loaded_by_uncommon_process_filter search *
windows_cloud_files_filter_loaded_by_uncommon_process_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1543.003 Windows Service Persistence
Exploitation
Installation
DE.AE
CIS 10

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Finding (Notable) No
Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) Yes
Anomaly detections generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events). They do not generate a Finding (Notable) directly.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.

Known False Positives

False positives may include other third-party cloud-based file storage software. Filter as necessary for your environment.

Associated Analytic Story

Intermediate Findings

Message Entity Field Entity Type Risk Score
Cloud Files Filter [$loaded_file_path$] loaded by suspicious process [$process_path$] on [$dest$] dest system 20

Threat Objects

Field Type
loaded_file_path loaded_file

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation ✅ Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub |

Version: 2