| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | Execution |
Detection: Windows WMI Reconnaissance Class Query
Description
The following analytic detects the use of WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) for reconnaissance and system information discovery on Windows endpoints. It identifies command-line queries targeting common Win32 WMI classes such as Win32_OperatingSystem, Win32_Processor, csproduct, Win32_DiskDrive, and Win32_PhysicalMemory, which are frequently leveraged to enumerate hardware, operating system details, and system configuration. Adversaries often use these queries during post-exploitation to fingerprint hosts, assess virtualization, and tailor follow-on activity. While WMIC usage can be legitimate for administrative and inventory tasks, suspicious or unexpected execution—particularly by non-administrative users or uncommon parent processes—may indicate malicious reconnaissance aligned with system discovery techniques.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
3 as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
4 (
5 NOT Processes.parent_process_path IN (
6 "*:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
7 "*:\\Program Files\\*",
8 "*:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
9 "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*"
10 )
11 OR
12 Processes.parent_process_name IN(
13 "cmd.exe",
14 "powershell*",
15 "pwsh.exe"
16 )
17 )
18 AND
19 (
20 Processes.process_name = "wmic.exe"
21 OR
22 Processes.original_file_name = "wmic.exe"
23 )
24 Processes.process IN (
25 "*csproduct*",
26 "*Win32_BaseBoard*",
27 "*Win32_Bios*",
28 "*Win32_DiskDrive*",
29 "*Win32_DisplayConfiguration*",
30 "*Win32_OperatingSystem*",
31 "*Win32_PhysicalMemory*",
32 "*Win32_PnPEntity*",
33 "*Win32_Processor*",
34 "*Win32_ShadowCopy*",
35 "*win32_ShortcutFile*",
36 "*win32_VideoController*"
37 )
38 by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
39 Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
40 Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
41 Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
42 Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
43
44| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
45
46| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
47
48| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
49
50| `windows_wmi_reconnaissance_class_query_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | Other | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
| Sysmon EventID 1 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
|
| Windows Event Log Security 4688 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Security' |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
| windows_wmi_reconnaissance_class_query_filter | search * |
windows_wmi_reconnaissance_class_query_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time | -70m@m |
| Latest Time | -10m@m |
| Schedule Window | auto |
| Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message:
An instance of [$parent_process_name$] spawning [$process_name$] was identified on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$] attempting to enumerate system information via WMI classes using the Command [$process$].
| Risk Object | Risk Object Type | Risk Score | Threat Objects |
|---|---|---|---|
| user | user | 20 | process_name, parent_process_name |
| dest | system | 20 | process_name, parent_process_name |
References
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 1