Detection: Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell

Updated Date: 2024-05-12 ID: 59b51620-94c9-11ec-b3d5-acde48001122 Author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk Type: TTP Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

The following analytic detects the use of the Set-ADAccountControl PowerShell cmdlet with parameters that disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this specific command execution. Disabling Kerberos Pre-Authentication is significant because it allows adversaries to perform offline brute force attacks against user passwords using the AS-REP Roasting technique. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to escalate privileges or maintain persistence within an Active Directory environment, posing a severe security risk.

Search

1`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Set-ADAccountControl*" AND ScriptBlockText="*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*") 
2| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id 
3| rename Computer as dest 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
6| `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source	Supported App
Powershell Script Block Logging 4104	Windows	`'xmlwineventlog'`	`'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'`	N/A

Macros Used

Name	Value
powershell	`(source=WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational OR source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational")`
kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter	`search *`

kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK

+ Kill Chain Phases

+ NIST

+ CIS

- Threat Actors

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1558	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	Credential Access
T1558.004	AS-REP Roasting	Credential Access

KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON

NistCategory.DE_CM

Cis18Value.CIS_10

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting	Value
Disabled	true
Cron Schedule	`0 * * * *`
Earliest Time	`-70m@m`
Latest Time	`-10m@m`
Schedule Window	`auto`
Creates Notable	Yes
Rule Title	`%name%`
Rule Description	`%description%`
Notable Event Fields	user, dest
Creates Risk Event	True

This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.

Known False Positives

Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purposes.

Associated Analytic Story

Active Directory Kerberos Attacks

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message	Risk Score	Impact	Confidence
Kerberos Pre Authentication was Disabled using PowerShell on $dest$	45	50	90

The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type	Status	Dataset	Source	Sourcetype
Validation	✅ Passing	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational`	`xmlwineventlog`
Integration	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational`	`xmlwineventlog`

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 3