Detection: Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account

Updated Date: 2024-09-30 ID: 51307514-1236-49f6-8686-d46d93cc2821 Author: Dean Luxton Type: TTP Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

The following analytic detects a user account initiating an Active Directory replication request, indicative of a DCSync attack. It leverages EventCode 4662 from the Windows Security Event Log, focusing on specific object types and replication permissions. This activity is significant because it can allow an attacker with sufficient privileges to request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of the entire domain.

Search

1`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectType IN ("%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}", "domainDNS") AND Properties IN ("*Replicating Directory Changes All*", "*{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*", "*{9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2}*","*{1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*") AND AccessMask="0x100" AND NOT (SubjectUserSid="NT AUT*" OR SubjectUserSid="S-1-5-18" OR SubjectDomainName="Window Manager" OR SubjectUserName="*$") 
2| stats min(_time) as _time, count by SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Computer, Logon_ID, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType, status 
3| rename SubjectDomainName as Target_Domain, SubjectUserName as user, Logon_ID as TargetLogonId, _time as attack_time 
4| appendpipe [
5| map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"] 
6| table attack_time, AuthenticationPackageName, LogonProcessName, LogonType, TargetUserSid, Target_Domain, user, Computer, TargetLogonId, status, src_ip, src_category, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType 
7| stats min(attack_time) as _time values(TargetUserSid) as TargetUserSid, values(Target_Domain) as Target_Domain, values(user) as user, values(Computer) as Computer, values(status) as status, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip by TargetLogonId 
8| `windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_by_user_account_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source
Windows Event Log Security 4662	Windows	`'xmlwineventlog'`	`'XmlWinEventLog:Security'`

Macros Used

Name	Value
wineventlog_security	`eventtype=wineventlog_security OR Channel=security OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Security`
windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_by_user_account_filter	`search *`

windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_by_user_account_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK

+ Kill Chain Phases

+ NIST

+ CIS

- Threat Actors

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1003.006	DCSync	Credential Access
T1003	OS Credential Dumping	Credential Access

KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON

NistCategory.DE_CM

Cis18Value.CIS_10

Earth Lusca

LAPSUS$

APT28

APT32

APT39

Axiom

Ember Bear

Leviathan

Poseidon Group

Sowbug

Suckfly

Tonto Team

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting	Value
Disabled	true
Cron Schedule	`0 * * * *`
Earliest Time	`-70m@m`
Latest Time	`-10m@m`
Schedule Window	`auto`
Creates Notable	Yes
Rule Title	`%name%`
Rule Description	`%description%`
Notable Event Fields	user, dest
Creates Risk Event	True

This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting eventcode 4662. The Advanced Security Audit policy settings Audit Directory Services Access within DS Access needs to be enabled, as well as the following SACLs applied to the domain root and all descendant objects. The principals everybody, Domain Computers, and Domain Controllers auditing the permissions Replicating Directory Changes, Replicating Directory Changes All, and Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set

Known False Positives

Azure AD Connect syncing operations.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message	Risk Score	Impact	Confidence
Windows Active Directory Replication Request Initiated by User Account $user$ at $src_ip$	100	100	100

The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type	Status	Dataset	Source	Sourcetype
Validation	✅ Passing	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Security`	`XmlWinEventLog`
Integration	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Security`	`XmlWinEventLog`

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 4