Detection: Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path

Updated Date: 2024-10-17 ID: 492f09cf-5d60-4d87-99dd-0bc325532dda Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk Type: Hunting Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

The following analytic detects a process from a non-standard file path on Windows attempting to create a remote thread in another process. This is identified using Sysmon EventCode 8, focusing on processes not originating from typical system directories. This behavior is significant as it often indicates process injection, a technique used by adversaries to evade detection or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code within another process, potentially leading to unauthorized actions and further compromise of the system.

1`sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage = "*.exe" AND NOT(SourceImage IN("C:\\Windows\\*", "C:\\Program File*", "%systemroot%\\*")) 
2| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage signature TargetProcessGuid SourceProcessGuid TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode dest 
3| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
5| `windows_process_injection_with_public_source_path_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Sysmon EventID 8 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
windows_process_injection_with_public_source_path_filter search *
windows_process_injection_with_public_source_path_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1055 Process Injection Defense Evasion
T1055.002 Portable Executable Injection Privilege Escalation
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_AE
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT32
APT37
APT41
APT5
Cobalt Group
Kimsuky
PLATINUM
Silence
TA2541
Turla
Wizard Spider
Gorgon Group
Rocke

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Risk Event False
This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.

Known False Positives

Some security products or third party applications may utilize CreateRemoteThread, filter as needed before enabling as a notable.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
process $SourceImage$ create a remote thread to process $TargetImage$ on host $dest$ 64 80 80
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation ✅ Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 4