Detection: Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll

Updated Date: 2024-10-17 ID: 406c21d6-6c75-4e9f-9ca9-48049a1dd90e Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk Type: Hunting Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

The following analytic detects a process loading the credui.dll or wincredui.dll module. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where these DLLs are loaded by processes outside typical system directories. This activity is significant because adversaries often abuse these modules to create fake credential prompts or dump credentials, posing a risk of credential theft. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to harvest user credentials, leading to unauthorized access and potential lateral movement within the network.

Search

1`sysmon` EventCode=7  (ImageLoaded = "*\\credui.dll" AND OriginalFileName = "credui.dll") OR (ImageLoaded = "*\\wincredui.dll" AND OriginalFileName = "wincredui.dll") AND NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\explorer.exe", "*\\windows\\system32\\*", "*\\windows\\sysWow64\\*", "*:\\program files*")) 
2| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName dest EventCode Signed ProcessId ProcessGuid 
3| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
5| `windows_input_capture_using_credential_ui_dll_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source
Sysmon EventID 7	Windows	`'xmlwineventlog'`	`'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'`

Macros Used

Name	Value
security_content_ctime	`convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)`
windows_input_capture_using_credential_ui_dll_filter	`search *`

windows_input_capture_using_credential_ui_dll_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK

+ Kill Chain Phases

+ NIST

+ CIS

- Threat Actors

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1056.002	GUI Input Capture	Collection
T1056	Input Capture	Credential Access

KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON

NistCategory.DE_AE

Cis18Value.CIS_10

FIN4

RedCurl

APT39

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting	Value
Disabled	true
Cron Schedule	`0 * * * *`
Earliest Time	`-70m@m`
Latest Time	`-10m@m`
Schedule Window	`auto`
Creates Risk Event	False

This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.

Implementation

The latest Sysmon TA 3.0 https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709 will add the ImageLoaded name to the process_name field, allowing this query to work. Use as an example and implement for other products.

Known False Positives

this module can be loaded by a third party application. Filter is needed.

Associated Analytic Story

Brute Ratel C4

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message	Risk Score	Impact	Confidence
a process $Image$ loaded $ImageLoaded$ in $dest$	9	30	30

The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type	Status	Dataset	Source	Sourcetype
Validation	✅ Passing	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational`	`XmlWinEventLog`
Integration	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational`	`XmlWinEventLog`

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 3