Detection: Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading In Same Process Path

Description

This detection identifies unsigned DLLs loaded through DLL side-loading with same file path with the process loaded the DLL, a technique observed in DarkGate malware. This detection monitors DLL loading, verifies signatures, and flags unsigned DLLs. Suspicious file paths and known executable associations are checked. Detecting such suspicious DLLs is crucial in preventing privilege escalation attacks and other potential security breaches. Regular security assessments, thorough monitoring, and implementing security best practices are essential in safeguarding systems from such threats.

1`sysmon` EventCode=7 Signed=false SignatureStatus != Valid NOT (Image IN ("*:\\windows\\system32\\*", "*:\\windows\\syswow64\\*", "c:\\Program Files*")) NOT (ImageLoaded IN ("*:\\windows\\system32\\*", "*:\\windows\\syswow64\\*", "c:\\Program Files*")) 
2|  rex field=Image "(?<ImageFolderPath>.+\\\)" 
3|  rex field=ImageLoaded "(?<ImageLoadedFolderPath>.+\\\)" 
4|  where ImageFolderPath = ImageLoadedFolderPath 
5| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ProcessGuid ImageLoaded user Computer EventCode ImageFolderPath ImageLoadedFolderPath Company Description Product Signed SignatureStatus 
6|  rename Computer as dest 
7| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
8| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
9| `windows_unsigned_dll_side_loading_in_same_process_path_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Sysmon EventID 7 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
windows_unsigned_dll_side_loading_in_same_process_path_filter search *
windows_unsigned_dll_side_loading_in_same_process_path_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading Defense Evasion
T1574 Hijack Execution Flow Persistence
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
KillChainPhase.INSTALLATION
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT19
APT3
APT32
APT41
BRONZE BUTLER
BlackTech
Chimera
Cinnamon Tempest
Daggerfly
Earth Lusca
FIN13
GALLIUM
Higaisa
Lazarus Group
LuminousMoth
MuddyWater
Mustang Panda
Naikon
Patchwork
SideCopy
Sidewinder
Threat Group-3390
Tropic Trooper
menuPass

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.

Known False Positives

unknown

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
An unsigned dll module was loaded on $dest$ 49 70 70
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 2