| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Privilege Escalation |
Detection: Windows Cloud Files Filter Log Created by Non-System Process
Description
Detects a non-system process causing creation of CldFlt0.etl under C:\Windows\System32\LogFiles\CloudFiles. This path is initialised by the CldFlt driver when a process calls CfRegisterSyncRoot() or CfConnectSyncRoot(). In the RedSun exploit this is a side-effect of the DoCloudStuff() function that registers a fake sync provider to create the cloud-tagged bait file. Legitimate cloud providers (OneDrive etc.) register sync roots from SYSTEM-level service processes, not from user-context executables.
Search
1`sysmon`
2EventCode=11
3TargetFilename = "*\\Windows\\System32\\LogFiles\\CloudFiles\\*"
4NOT Image IN (
5 "*:\\Windows\\System32*",
6 "*:\\Windows\\SysWOW64*",
7 "*:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\*"
8)
9
10| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
11 max(_time) as lastTime
12 by action dest file_name file_path Image process_guid
13 process_id user_id vendor_product
14
15| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
16
17| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
18
19| `windows_cloud_files_filter_log_created_by_non_system_process_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sysmon EventID 11 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
| windows_cloud_files_filter_log_created_by_non_system_process_filter | search * |
windows_cloud_files_filter_log_created_by_non_system_process_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
CVE
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time | -70m@m |
| Latest Time | -10m@m |
| Schedule Window | auto |
| Creates Finding (Notable) | Yes |
| Rule Title | %name% |
| Rule Description | %description% |
| Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
| Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) | No |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
Known False Positives
No false positives have been identified at this time.
Associated Analytic Story
Finding
| Title | Entity Field | Entity Type | Risk Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| Non-System process $Image$ created a cloud files filter $file_name$ on host $dest$ | dest | system | 50 |
References
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 1