Detection: UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object

Updated Date: 2024-08-14 ID: 2bcccd20-fc2b-11eb-8d22-acde48001122 Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk Type: TTP Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

The following analytic detects a potential UAC bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where colorui.dll is loaded by a process other than colorcpl.exe, excluding common system directories. This activity is significant because UAC bypass techniques are often used by malware, such as LockBit ransomware, to gain elevated privileges without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence within the environment.

1`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\colorui.dll" process_name != "colorcpl.exe" NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*")) 
2| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest user_id EventCode Signed ProcessId 
3| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
5| `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source Supported App
Sysmon EventID 7 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' N/A

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter search *
uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution Defense Evasion
T1218.003 CMSTP Defense Evasion
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
Lazarus Group
Cobalt Group
MuddyWater

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.

Known False Positives

not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $dest$. 48 60 80
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation ✅ Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 3