ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1218.011 | Rundll32 | Defense Evasion |
Detection: Windows Application Whitelisting Bypass Attempt via Rundll32
Description
The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe calling one of the following DLLs:
- Advpack.dll
- Ieadvpack.dll
- Syssetup.dll
- Setupapi.dll
with one of the following functions: "LaunchINFSection", "InstallHinfSection", "SetupInfObjectInstallAction". This method is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control or whitelisting bypass, allowing script code execution from a file. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further network compromise. Investigate the script content, network connections, and any spawned child processes for further context.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
3 count min(_time) as firstTime
4 max(_time) as lastTime
5from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
6`process_rundll32`
7Processes.process IN ("*syssetup*", "*advpack*", "*setupapi*")
8Processes.process IN ("*LaunchINFSection*", "*InstallHinfSection*", "*SetupInfObjectInstallAction*")
9by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
10 Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
11 Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
12 Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
13 Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
14
15| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
16
17| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
18
19| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
20
21| `windows_application_whitelisting_bypass_attempt_via_rundll32_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | N/A | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
Sysmon EventID 1 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
|
Windows Event Log Security 4688 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Security' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
process_rundll32 | (Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.EXE) |
windows_application_whitelisting_bypass_attempt_via_rundll32_filter | search * |
windows_application_whitelisting_bypass_attempt_via_rundll32_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product.
The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model.
Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may leverage one of the following DLLs syssetup.dll, dvpack.dll, ieadvpack.dll and can trigger a false positive. Apply additional filters as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message:
An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
Risk Object | Risk Object Type | Risk Score | Threat Objects |
---|---|---|---|
dest | system | 80 | parent_process_name, process_name |
user | user | 80 | parent_process_name, process_name |
References
-
https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
-
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Ieadvpack/
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 1