| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | Defense Impairment |
Detection: Windows Filtering Platform Policy Added to Block EDR Process
Description
Detects the modification of a Windows Filtering Platform Policy to block the communication of known EDR processes. This can be used by attackers to impair the functionality of these tools and to hide their activities on the machine.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
3 count min(_time) as firstTime
4 max(_time) as lastTime
5
6from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where
7
8Registry.action="modified"
9Registry.registry_path="*\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules*"
10Registry.registry_value_data="*Action=Block*"
11Registry.registry_value_data="*App=*"
12Registry.registry_value_data IN (
13 "*AmSvc.exe*",
14 "*cb.exe*",
15 "*CETASvc.exe*",
16 "*CNTAoSMgr.exe*",
17 "*CrAmTray.exe*",
18 "*CrsSvc.exe*",
19 "*CybereasonAV.exe*",
20 "*CylanceSvc.exe*",
21 "*cyserver.exe*",
22 "*CyveraService.exe*",
23 "*CyvrFsFlt.exe*",
24 "*EIConnector.exe*",
25 "*ekrn.exe*",
26 "*elastic-agent.exe*",
27 "*elastic-endpoint.exe*",
28 "*EndpointBasecamp.exe*",
29 "*ExecutionPreventionSvc.exe*",
30 "*filebeat.exe*",
31 "*fortiedr.exe*",
32 "*hurukai.exe*",
33 "*LogProcessorService.exe*",
34 "*MsMpEng.exe*",
35 "*MsSense.exe*",
36 "*Ntrtscan.exe*",
37 "*PccNTMon.exe*",
38 "*QualysAgent.exe*",
39 "*RepMgr.exe*",
40 "*RepUtils.exe*",
41 "*RepUx.exe*",
42 "*RepWAV.exe*",
43 "*RepWSC.exe*",
44 "*SenseCncProxy.exe*",
45 "*SenseIR.exe*",
46 "*SenseNdr.exe*",
47 "*SenseSampleUploader.exe*",
48 "*SentinelAgent.exe*",
49 "*SentinelAgentWorker.exe*",
50 "*SentinelBrowserNativeHost.exe*",
51 "*SentinelHelperService.exe*",
52 "*SentinelServiceHost.exe*",
53 "*SentinelStaticEngine.exe*",
54 "*SentinelStaticEngineScanner.exe*",
55 "*sfc.exe*",
56 "*TaniumClient.exe*",
57 "*TaniumCX.exe*",
58 "*TaniumDetectEngine.exe*",
59 "*TMBMSRV.exe*",
60 "*TmCCSF.exe*",
61 "*TmListen.exe*",
62 "*TmWSCSvc.exe*",
63 "*Traps.exe*",
64 "*winlogbeat.exe*",
65 "*WSCommunicator.exe*",
66 "*xagt.exe*"
67)
68
69by Registry.dest Registry.vendor_product Registry.user Registry.status
70 Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_hive
71 Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.process_path
72 Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_key_name
73
74
75| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
76
77| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
78
79| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
80
81| `windows_filtering_platform_policy_added_to_block_edr_process_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sysmon EventID 13 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
| windows_filtering_platform_policy_added_to_block_edr_process_filter | search * |
windows_filtering_platform_policy_added_to_block_edr_process_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time | -70m@m |
| Latest Time | -10m@m |
| Schedule Window | auto |
| Creates Notable | Yes |
| Rule Title | %name% |
| Rule Description | %description% |
| Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
| Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Some legitimate administrative tasks or security configurations may create filtering platform policies. Verify actions with authorized IT personnel before alerting.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message:
Suspicious Windows Filtering Platform Policy with value $registry_value_data$ created on $dest$.
| Risk Object | Risk Object Type | Risk Score | Threat Objects |
|---|---|---|---|
| dest | system | 50 | registry_path, registry_value_name |
References
-
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/edr-bypass-extortion-attempt-thwarted/
-
https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/EDRSandblast?tab=readme-ov-file
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 1