ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1087.002 | Domain Account | Discovery |
T1069.001 | Local Groups | Discovery |
T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | Discovery |
T1087.001 | Local Account | Discovery |
T1087 | Account Discovery | Discovery |
T1069.002 | Domain Groups | Discovery |
T1069 | Permission Groups Discovery | Discovery |
Detection: Detect AzureHound File Modifications
Description
The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as *-azurecollection.zip
and various .json
files, on disk. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on file creation events with specific filenames. This activity is significant because AzureHound is a tool used to gather information about Azure environments, similar to SharpHound for on-premises Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker is collecting sensitive Azure environment data, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation within the cloud infrastructure.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*-azurecollection.zip", "*-azprivroleadminrights.json", "*-azglobaladminrights.json", "*-azcloudappadmins.json", "*-azapplicationadmins.json") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
6| `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
Sysmon EventID 11 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter | search * |
detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint
datamodel in the Filesystem
node.
Known False Positives
False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
A file - $file_name$ was written to disk that is related to AzureHound, a AzureAD enumeration utility, has occurred on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. | 63 | 70 | 90 |
References
-
https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-bloodhound-4-0-the-azure-update-9b2b26c5e350
-
https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/Legacy-AzureHound.ps1/blob/master/AzureHound.ps1
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 4