Detection: Create Remote Thread In Shell Application

Description

The following analytic detects suspicious process injection in command shell applications, specifically targeting cmd.exe and powershell.exe. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 8 to identify the creation of remote threads within these shell processes. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by malware, such as IcedID, to inject malicious code and execute it within legitimate processes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system security.

 1`sysmon`
 2EventCode=8
 3TargetImage IN (
 4    "*\\cmd.exe",
 5    "*\\powershell_ise.exe",
 6    "*\\powershell.exe",
 7    "*\\pwsh.exe"
 8)
 9
10| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
11              max(_time) as lastTime
12              values(NewThreadId) as "NewThreadId"
13              values(StartAddress) as "StartAddress"
14  by dest signature_id signature
15     SourceProcessGuid SourceProcessId SourceImage
16     TargetProcessGuid TargetProcessId TargetImage
17     StartModule StartFunction vendor_product
18
19| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
20
21| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
22
23| `create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Sysmon EventID 8 Windows icon Windows 'XmlWinEventLog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter search *
create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1055 Process Injection Privilege Escalation
Exploitation
DE.CM
CIS 10

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Finding (Notable) Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) No
TTP detections generate a Finding (Notable) and may generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events) for associated entities.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.

Known False Positives

No false positives have been identified at this time.

Associated Analytic Story

Finding

Title Entity Field Entity Type Risk Score
The process $SourceImage$ created a remote thread into the shell app process $TargetImage$ in host $dest$ dest system 50

Threat Objects

Field Type
TargetImage process_name
SourceImage process_name

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub |

Version: 13