Detection: Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path

Updated Date: 2024-09-30 ID: 0f43758f-1fe9-470a-a9e4-780acc4d5407 Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk Type: Anomaly Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

The following analytic detects FTP connections initiated by processes located in non-standard installation paths on Windows systems. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 3 to identify network connections where the process image path does not match common directories like "Program Files" or "Windows\System32". This activity is significant as FTP is often used by adversaries and malware, such as AgentTesla, for Command and Control (C2) communications to exfiltrate stolen data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data transfer, exposing sensitive information and compromising the integrity of the affected host.

1`sysmon` EventCode=3 NOT(Image IN("*\\program files*", "*\\windows\\system32\\*","*\\windows\\SysWOW64\\*")) (DestinationPortName="ftp" OR DestinationPort=21) 
2| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image DestinationPort DestinationPortName DestinationHostname DestinationIp SourcePort SourcePortName Protocol SourceHostname dest user 
3| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
5| `windows_file_transfer_protocol_in_non_common_process_path_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Sysmon EventID 3 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
windows_file_transfer_protocol_in_non_common_process_path_filter search *
windows_file_transfer_protocol_in_non_common_process_path_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1071.003 Mail Protocols Command And Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol Command And Control
KillChainPhase.COMMAND_AND_CONTROL
NistCategory.DE_AE
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT28
APT32
Kimsuky
SilverTerrier
Turla
INC Ransom
Magic Hound
Rocke
TeamTNT

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and sysmon eventcode = 3 connection events from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.

Known False Positives

third party application may use this network protocol as part of its feature. Filter is needed.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
a process $Image$ is having a FTP connection to $DestinationHostname$ in $dest$ 9 30 30
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation ✅ Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 3