| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1586 | Compromise Accounts | Resource Development |
| T1586.003 | Cloud Accounts | Resource Development |
| T1110 | Brute Force | Credential Access |
Detection: AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset
Description
The following analytic detects the resetting of the master user password for an Amazon RDS DB instance. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify events where the ModifyDBInstance API call includes a new masterUserPassword parameter. This activity is significant because unauthorized password resets can grant attackers access to sensitive data stored in production databases, such as credit card information, PII, and healthcare data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, regulatory non-compliance, and significant reputational damage. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the password reset.
Search
1`cloudtrail` eventSource="rds.amazonaws.com" eventName=ModifyDBInstance "requestParameters.masterUserPassword"=*
2| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.dBInstanceIdentifier) as database_id by src awsRegion eventName userAgent user_arn
3| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
4| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
5| `aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source | Supported App |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AWS CloudTrail ModifyDBInstance |  AWS |
'aws:cloudtrail' |
'aws_cloudtrail' |
N/A |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| cloudtrail | sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail |
| aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter | search * |
aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
MITRE ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phases
NIST
CIS
Threat Actors
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
KillChainPhase.WEAPONIZATION
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT29
APT28
APT38
APT39
DarkVishnya
Dragonfly
FIN5
Fox Kitten
HEXANE
OilRig
Turla
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time | -70m@m |
| Latest Time | -10m@m |
| Schedule Window | auto |
| Creates Notable | Yes |
| Rule Title | %name% |
| Rule Description | %description% |
| Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
| Creates Risk Event | True |
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.
Implementation
You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
Known False Positives
Users may genuinely reset the RDS password.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
| Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| $database_id$ password has been reset from IP $src$ | 49 | 70 | 70 |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
References
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | aws_cloudtrail |
aws:cloudtrail |
| Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | aws_cloudtrail |
aws:cloudtrail |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 3