Detection: PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset

Description

The following analytic identifies the provisioning of a new MFA device shortly after a password reset. It detects this activity by correlating Windows Event Log events for password changes (EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.

Search

 1`pingid` "result.message" = "*Device Paired*" 
 2| rex field=result.message "Device (Unp)?(P)?aired (?<device_extract>.+)" 
 3| eval src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), reason = 'result.message' 
 4| eval object=CASE(ISNOTNULL('resources{}.devicemodel'),'resources{}.devicemodel',true(),device_extract) 
 5| eval action=CASE(match('result.message',"Device Paired*"),"created",match('result.message', "Device Unpaired*"),"deleted") 
 6| stats count min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime, values(reason) as reason by src,user,action,object 
 7| join type=outer user [
 8| search `wineventlog_security` EventID IN(4723,4724) 
 9| eval PW_Change_Time = _time, user = upper(user) 
10| fields user,src_user,EventID,PW_Change_Time] 
11| eval timeDiffRaw = round(lastTime - PW_Change_Time) 
12| eval timeDiff = replace(tostring(abs(timeDiffRaw) ,"duration"),"(\d*)\+*(\d+):(\d+):(\d+)","\2 hours \3 minutes") 
13| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
14| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
15| `security_content_ctime(PW_Change_Time)` 
16| where timeDiffRaw > 0 AND timeDiffRaw < 3600 
17| `pingid_new_mfa_method_after_credential_reset_filter`

Data Source

Macros Used

Annotations

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Implementation

Target environment must ingest Windows Event Log and PingID(PingOne) data sources. Specifically from logs from Active Directory Domain Controllers and JSON logging from a PingID(PingOne) enterprise environment, either via Webhook or Push Subscription.

Known False Positives

False positives may be generated by normal provisioning workflows that generate a password reset followed by a device registration.

Associated Analytic Story

• Compromised User Account

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

References

• https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-azure-ad-blog/defend-your-users-from-mfa-fatigue-attacks/ba-p/2365677

• https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/mfa-fatigue-hackers-new-favorite-tactic-in-high-profile-breaches/

• https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/

• https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/

• https://docs.pingidentity.com/r/en-us/pingoneforenterprise/p14e_subscriptions?tocId=3xhnxjX3VzKNs3SXigWnQA

Detection Testing

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 2